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I. INTRODUCTION
Minnesota’s Civil Damages Act is a creature of statute without
1
counterpart in common law. The Act, referred to as the “Dram Shop
Act,” is highly penal in nature and is intended to provide remedies for
damages attributable to commercial lenders’ illegal sale of intoxicating
2
liquors. Since the Act’s inception more than ninety-two years ago,
Minnesota courts traditionally have construed it in a strict fashion. Over
its long evolution, the “duet” of legislative action and court interpretation
served to clarify several ambiguities within the Act. Despite precise and
oftentimes circumstantial application, certain ambiguities remain. The
following article will—in the context of recent Minnesota Dram Shop
decisions—analyze the ambiguities in Dram Shop law and recommend
clarifications in these areas.
II. ELEMENTS OF PROOF
To establish a claim under Minnesota’s Dram Shop Act, a plaintiff
3
must prove the following five elements:
1. An illegal sale of intoxicating liquor, including 3.2 beer or
“strong” beer;

1. See MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 subd. 1 (2002); Fitzer v. Bloom, 253 N.W.2d 395,
403 (Minn. 1977) (holding that because the legislature has provided a remedy for the
illegal sale of intoxicating liquor in the Civil Damages Act, the legislature has preempted
the field and has provided the exclusive remedy in the act). A common-law cause of
action for negligence will be allowed only where the act does not apply. Id.
2. See Vill. of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284, 301 (8th Cir. 1961)
(stating that “[t]he statute was intended to provide remedies unknown to the common law
for certain losses attributable to illegal acts in connection with the dispensation of
intoxicating liquor and the Legislature was content, as a matter of its measure of social
justice, to place upon those who benefit by that trade the burden occasioned by these
illegalities”); see also Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Minn. 1982) (holding
that the definition in the Civil Damages Act that “ ‘any person’ who sells or barters liquor
means a person in the business of providing liquor, and not a social host who happens to
receive some consideration from his guests in return for drinks he provides”). The statute
has been expanded in recent years to provide limited social host liability against persons
21 or older who provide alcohol to a person younger than 21. See MINN. STAT. §
340A.90 (2002) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 1, 2000, ch. 423, § 1, 2000 Minn.
Laws 884).
3. MINN. STAT. § 340A.802 (2002). See Hartwig v. Loyal Order of Moose, 253
Minn. 347, 356, 91 N.W.2d 794, 801 (Minn. 1958) (holding that “[i]t is elementary that
before plaintiffs are entitled to recover in these cases they must show by competent proof
that defendants . . . unlawfully furnished intoxicating liquor . . . which caused or
contributed to . . . intoxication and that the same was a proximate cause of the
injuries . . . .”).
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2. The illegal sale caused or contributed to the alleged
intoxicated person’s (AIP’s) condition;
3. Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the AIP’s intoxication;
4. Plaintiff sustained damages recoverable under the Act; and
5. Defendant received written notice of plaintiff’s intent to
make a claim for damages within 240 days of the date plaintiff
entered into an attorney-client relationship regarding the
4
claim.
A. Illegal Sales
The Civil Damages Act expressly imposes Dram Shop liability for
5
“illegally selling” alcoholic beverages. It applies to the “sale” of any
alcoholic beverage with at least one-half of 1 percent alcohol by
6
volume. The Act itself does not define what is illegal, but Minnesota
courts developed a focused analysis to determine whether a particular
liquor sale imposes Dram Shop liability. The court reviews: (1) whether
the sale was in violation of a provision of Chapter 340A, and if so (2)
whether the violation was substantially related to the purposes sought to
be achieved by the Civil Damages Act. The Minnesota Supreme Court
observed that this analysis furthers the legislature’s intent to curtail
illegal sales impacting “the public’s access to and consumption of
7
alcoholic beverages.”
The appellate courts’ interpretation of the Act has resulted in a
lengthy list of sales considered illegal for purposes of a Dram Shop
action. Statutory violations that may give rise to a liquor liability claim
8
9
include: (1) sales to obviously intoxicated persons, (2) sales to minors,
10
and (3) miscellaneous others including (a) sales after hours, (b) sales on
4. MINN. STAT. § 340A.802, subd. 2 (2002). In the case of claims for contribution
or indemnity, the notice must be served within 120 days after the injury occurs or within
sixty days after receiving written notice of a claim for contribution or indemnity,
whichever is applicable. Id.
5. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (2002).
6. MINN. STAT. § 340A.101, subd. 2 (2002).
7. Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19, 21-22 (Minn. 1989).
8. MINN. STAT. § 340A.502 (2002).
9. MINN. STAT. § 340A.503 (2002). Any sale or furnishment of alcohol to a minor
constitutes an “illegal act” under the dram shop statute. In actions involving minors, the
plaintiff need not prove that the minor was intoxicated when the sale was made because
the sale itself is illegal.
10. MINN. STAT. § 340A.504 (2002). A liquor vendor selling intoxicating liquor
after hours is “illegally selling” intoxicating liquor. See Hollerich v. Good Thunder, 340
N.W.2d 665, 668 (Minn. 1983) (holding that “the prohibition against after-hour sales is
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prohibited days, (c) sales at prohibited locations, (d) sales to
13
nonmembers of a private club, and (e) sales by vendors of “on sale”
liquor license to patrons that the vendor knows or should know will
14
consume alcoholic beverages off premises.
Although the legacy of Dram Shop jurisprudence has effectively
identified particular violations, the level of evidentiary proof to establish
an illegal sale has not been well defined in all categories of illegal sales.
In 2002, Minnesota Dram Shop decisions focused on sales to “obviously
intoxicated” persons.
1. Sales to “obviously intoxicated” persons (Minn. Stat. §
340A.502)
“No person may sell, give, furnish, or in any way procure for
another alcoholic beverages for the use of an obviously intoxicated
15
person.”
This statutory prohibition applies only if intoxication is
“observable in appearance or behavior of the person to whom the
16
17
intoxicating liquor is furnished.” In Strand v. Village of Watson, the
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the following definition of “obvious
intoxication”: “[T]here must be such outward manifestation of
intoxication that a person using his reasonable powers of observation can
18
see or should see that such person has become intoxicated.”
In other words, a finding of obvious intoxication does not require
proof of any specified amount of drinking or any degree of intoxication,
but requires proof the AIP has “lost control to any extent of his mental or
physical faculties and that such condition is, or should be, observable or
19
apparent to the seller” at the time of the alleged illegal sale. Common
sufficiently related to the purposes of the Dramshop Act so that such sales by a vendor
constitute ‘illegally selling’ within the meaning of the Act”).
11. MINN. STAT. § 340A.504. The sale of alcohol is prohibited on certain days and
at certain times. A sale on a prohibited day is analogous to a sale after hours and is an
“illegal sale” per se.
12. MINN. STAT. § 340A.412, subd. 4 (2002) (prohibiting the sale of intoxicating
liquors in specified locations).
13. MINN. STAT. § 340A.404, subd. 1(4) (2002) (allowing some municipalities to
issue “on-sale” licenses to clubs). These licenses permit sales to members and bona fide
guests only. Id. Therefore, a sale to a non-member or bona fide guest is illegal.
14. MINN. STAT. § 340A.101, subd. 21 (2002) (limiting consumption of alcoholic
beverages sold under an on-sale liquor license to the licensed premises only).
15. MINN. STAT. § 340A.502 (2002).
16. Mjos v. Howard Lake, 287 Minn. 427, 432, 178 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Minn. 1970).
17. 245 Minn. 414, 72 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1955).
18. Id. at 422, 72 N.W.2d at 615.
19. Murphy v. Hennen, 264 Minn. 457, 463, 119 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Minn. 1963).
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indices of obvious intoxication include: slurred speech, unsteady gait,
unusually loud or boisterous speech, and bloodshot eyes.
A blood test or urinalysis is evidence in an “obvious intoxication”
20
case but does not conclusively establish obvious intoxication.
The
Minnesota Supreme Court has confirmed a high blood-alcohol reading—
via blood test or urinalysis test—does not, as a matter of law, establish
21
obvious intoxication. “Obvious intoxication” is an issue to be decided
by the fact finder. No particular evidence is given more or less weight as
a matter of law, but all evidence is left for the jury or judge to balance.
In the unpublished case of Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Makitalo, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reviewed a jury instruction regarding the
22
definition of “obviously intoxicated.” In Stevens, plaintiffs argued they
were entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) because
the evidence demonstrated Makitalo exhibited signs of obvious
23
intoxication when served by the Eagle’s Nest Resort bartender.
Plaintiffs also contended the district court erroneously instructed the jury
24
regarding the definition of “obviously intoxicated.” The disputed jury
instruction included the following sentence: “A person is not obviously
intoxicated within the meaning of the Dram Shop statute simply by
25
virtue of having reached a certain blood alcohol content level.”
In upholding the district court’s judgment and instruction, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held, “[C]ontrary to appellants’ assertion,
this instruction did not advise the jury that blood alcohol content could
not be considered as circumstantial evidence of a person’s
26
intoxication.” The Stevens court observed, “[T]he Minnesota Supreme
Court has stated that a high blood alcohol reading alone is not sufficient

20. See Strand, 245 Minn. at 422-23, 72 N.W.2d at 615-16 (holding that
“[c]ircumstantial evidence may help to establish the essential fact [‘obvious’ or ‘visible’
intoxication], but there must be evidence from which it reasonably may be inferred that
the essential fact [‘obvious’ or ‘visible’ intoxication] did exist”).
21. See Seeley v. Sobczak, 281 N.W.2d 368, 370-71 (Minn. 1979) (holding that it
was improper to presume that a certain blood-alcohol content establishes “obvious
intoxication” as a matter of law, where the alleged intoxicated person possessed a bloodalcohol content of 0.269 percent).
22. No. C7-01-1791, 2002 WL 1315827 (Minn. Ct. App. June 18, 2002).
Unpublished opinions of the court of appeals are not precedential, not controlling, and
often are treated as having limited value. See MINN. STAT. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (1998).
However, unpublished opinions may be cited as persuasive authority. Id.
23. Id. at *1.
24. Id. at *1-2.
25. Id. at *2.
26. Id.
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27

as a matter of law to establish obvious intoxication.”
As an unpublished case, Stevens has no precedential effect and
should not be cited for legal propositions. However, the case reveals the
Minnesota appellate courts’ general deference to the finder of fact where
“obvious intoxication” is at issue. Therefore, a jury or judge may find
that someone was “obviously intoxicated” by virtue of any relevant
evidence, such as testimony from a toxicologist or eyewitness testimony
regarding the physical and mental state of the AIP. As long as the fact
finder does not conclude “obvious intoxication” solely on the basis of the
AIP’s reported blood-alcohol content and absent some other
circumstantial or direct evidence, the decision of that fact finder will
stand.
While blood-alcohol content alone does not translate into “obvious
intoxication” as a matter of law, the recent, unpublished case of DeSanti
v. Youngs indicates an illegal sale to an “obviously intoxicated” person
28
can be found solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
More
precisely, the DeSanti court, in the absence of direct testimony or
evidence establishing an illegal sale, permitted the jury to infer an illegal
sale occurred based on circumstantial evidence (toxicological testimony
based on blood alcohol content, consumption history, and AIP’s
testimony regarding his behavior and level of intoxication).
In DeSanti, appellee Youngs arrived at appellants’ bar (The Barn) at
approximately 12:30 p.m. on August 1, 1999 for “customer appreciation
29
day.” The Barn’s liquor license allows only the sale of 3.2 beer, but
The Barn allows patrons to bring their own hard alcohol to mix with soda
30
and other “set-ups.” Youngs brought with him a 750-milliliter bottle of
31
Black Velvet whiskey. “At trial, Youngs testified that he had eight to
32
The bartender
ten drinks from the bottle of Black Velvet . . . .”
testified that around 6:00 p.m. she saw Youngs with a half full bottle of
33
whiskey.
“Young’s last recollection at The Barn is playing
34
horseshoes . . . .” Youngs testified that at this point “he ‘wasn’t doing
very good with the horseshoes,’ and the he was ‘landing short, being way

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. (citing Seeley v. Sobczak, 281 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn. 1979)).
No. C8-02-1311, 2003 WL 139393 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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35

off.’ ”
Youngs, apparently feeling that good luck from holding
horseshoes all afternoon would allow him to drive home safely, left The
Barn in his vehicle at approximately 7:00 p.m., then struck Victoria
36
DeSanti as she rode her bicycle on County Road 18.
“Youngs was
37
arrested, and his blood alcohol content (BAC) measured .32 [percent].”
At trial plaintiff’s toxicologist testified that “once Youngs’ BAC reached
38
.20 [percent], signs of intoxication would have been evident.”
The Youngs court confirmed the standard for obvious intoxication
is whether a person could reasonably see that the buyer was
39
intoxicated. Despite arguments from The Barn that the circumstantial
evidence offered cannot alone sustain a “reasonable inference that an
40
illegal sale occurred,” the Desanti court held that “circumstantial
evidence supports a reasonable inference that The Barn sold Youngs
41
alcohol while he was obviously intoxicated . . . .” The court based this
conclusion on “(1) the testimony about Youngs’ deterioration in motor
skills while at The Barn, (2) the evidence of Young’s BAC when he was
arrested, and (3) the toxicologist’s testimony regarding the level of BAC
42
at which Youngs would have shown signs of intoxication.”
Evaluating the verdict in light of the lack of direct evidence that
43
Youngs purchased beer from The Barn, the DeSanti court explained,
“Where circumstantial evidence reasonably permits different inferences,
44
the choice of the inference to be drawn rests with the factfinder.”
Specifically, “along with the evidence that he drank one-half of the bottle
of whiskey, we must consider how Youngs’ BAC reached .32
45
[percent].”
The toxicologist “testified that 12 to 14 beers would
contain the same amount of alcohol as one-half of the bottle of whiskey,
and that consuming both would have brought Youngs’s BAC to at least
46
.32 [percent].”
The court stated, “The jury could infer from this
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *2.
38. Id. at *4.
39. Id. at *5 (citing Jewett v. Deutsch, 437 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989)).
40. DeSanti, No. C8-02-1311 at *5.
41. Id.
42. Id. at *6.
43. Id. at *7.
44. Id. (citing Fogarty v. Martin Hotel Co., 257 Minn. 398, 403, 101 N.W.2d 601,
605 (Minn. 1960)).
45. DeSanti, No. C8-02-1311 at *7.
46. Id.
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testimony that one-half of the bottle of whiskey would not be sufficient
47
to bring Youngs’ BAC to .32 [percent].” The court found that “[f]rom
the evidence presented, beer sold at The Barn was the only alternative
48
alcohol source available to Youngs.”
The court recognized that “no single person’s testimony presents
49
direct evidence of an illegal sale.” Nevertheless, the court concluded
that all of the circumstantial evidence viewed together in a light most
favorable to the verdict permitted a reasonable inference that Youngs
50
was obviously intoxicated.
In DeSanti, the court of appeals demonstrated deference to the
jury’s decision regarding “obvious intoxication,” allowing the fact finder
to make any “reasonable inference” possible in light of the “totality of
51
evidence.” The decision underscored the fact-sensitive and subjective
nature of deciding the issue of “obvious intoxication.”
B. Causation
Upon determination an illegal sale occurred, the Civil Damages Act
requires a plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to satisfy two causation
questions: (1) was the illegal sale a cause of the intoxication, and if so (2)
52
was the intoxication a cause of plaintiff’s injuries?
From a historical and developmental perspective, this two-step
causation analysis reflects a slow departure from the “proximate
contributing cause standard” initially codified in 1952 under Minnesota
53
Statutes section 340.95.
Subsequent cases confirm that judicial
interpretation of this proximate cause standard required a plaintiff to
show a defendant illegally sold liquor that “caused” intoxication and
54
proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries.
However, following these
cases, Minnesota courts avoided the occasion to expressly require that
the causal relationships be proximate until the Minnesota Supreme Court
47. Id. at *8.
48. Id.
49. Id. at *10.
50. Id. at *10-11.
51. Id.
52. Rambaum v. Swisher, 435 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. 1989).
53. MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1952) (repealed, 1985 ch. 305 art. 13 § 1; renumbered
340A.801).
54. See Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 432, 57 N.W.2d 254, 258-59
(1953) (liquor illegally sold need not be sole cause of intoxication; enough for liquor to
be a proximately contributing cause); see also Strand v. Vill. of Watson, 245 Minn. 414,
419, 72 N.W.2d 609, 614 (1955) (intoxication must be the proximate cause of plaintiff’s
injuries).
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briefly revisited the issue in Kryzer v. Champlin American Legion No.
55
600. In Kryzer, an intoxicated plaintiff injured her wrist while being
56
forcibly removed from the bar by an employee. Relying on case law
57
from 1882, the Kryzer court rejected the “but for” causation test and
58
made a distinction between the “occasion” and the “cause” of an injury.
The court clarified that, while plaintiff’s intoxication may have been the
“occasion” for her ejection from the bar, it did not “cause” the injury to
her wrist; rather, the act of the bar employee who ejected the plaintiff
59
was the cause of her injury.
Following Kryzer, the causation standard appears to require a direct
causal relationship between a person’s intoxication and the injury,
demonstrated by a proximate-cause analysis rather than a “but for” test.
Interestingly, Minnesota’s civil jury instructions for Civil Damages Act
cases define direct cause as “a cause that had a substantial part in
60
bringing about” the plaintiff’s injury. The supreme court has applied
61
the substantial-factor test to determine whether a cause is direct.
1. The Illegal Sale Caused or Contributed to the Intoxication
Once a plaintiff establishes an illegal sale of alcoholic beverages, he
or she must also prove the illegal sale caused or contributed to the
62
alleged intoxicated person’s (AIP’s) intoxication.
The illegally sold
63
In evaluating
alcohol need not be the sole cause of intoxication.
whether the illegal sale contributed to the intoxication, the fact finder
must determine whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates a
“practical and substantial relationship” between the illegal sale and
64
subsequent intoxication.
55. Kryzer v. Champlin Am. Legion No. 600, 494 N.W.2d 35, 37 (Minn. 1992).
56. Id. at 36.
57. Id. at 37 (citing Nelson v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 74,
14 N.W. 360 (1882)).
58. Kryzer, 494 N.W.2d at 37.
59. Id.
60. MINNESOTA DIST. JUDGES ASS’N COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES,
MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (Civil) JIG 45.30 (Michael K. Steenson & Peter
B. Knapp, rep.) in 4 MINN. PRACTICE 1, 268 (4th ed. 1999).
61. Id. at § 27.10.
62. See Weber v. Au, 512 N.W.2d 348, 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
“the civil liability statute requires a causal connection between the intoxication and the
injury, not just the sale and the injury”).
63. See Murphy v. Hennen, 264 Minn. 457, 463, 119 N.W.2d 489, 493 (1963) (“It
is enough if such intoxicants combine with other intoxicants that may have been legally
sold or furnished to be a concurring or proximately contributing cause”).
64. See Kvanli v. Vill. of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 484, 139 N.W.2d 275, 277
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This standard is sufficiently broad to address the various Dram Shop
violations and the requisite illegal sale-intoxication nexus. Like a fishing
net cast in the sea, however, this broad standard may snare some alcohol
vendors that, as a matter of common sense and public policy, should not
be held liable under the Act. For example, a bar that served the AIP a de
minimus or negligible amount of alcohol could be found liable for
making an “illegal sale” to an “obviously intoxicated person” even when
its sale had little or no practical effect on the AIP’s intoxication or the
plaintiff’s injuries. Does the sale of a bottle of beer to a patron
exhibiting borderline evidence of impairment—which is then only halfconsumed in five minutes by the patron before he leaves the bar, gets in
his car and strikes a pedestrian crossing the street to the bar—create
Dram Shop liability? Should it?
The appellate courts have yet to provide clear guidance in this area.
There are no Minnesota cases specifically addressing such situations. At
65
best, Minnesota courts have touched this issue on a cursory level. In
Hahn v. City of Ortonville, the supreme court held that liquor purchased
at a municipal liquor store three or four hours earlier was a proximate
cause of an assailant’s intoxication, despite considerable post-sale
66
consumption of alcohol obtained elsewhere prior to the assault.
In Murphy v. Hennen, the supreme court reaffirmed that illegally
sold intoxicants need be only a contributing cause to the resulting
67
intoxication. In that case, an illegal sale was made to a minor who then
68
gave the alcohol to an adult. The adult later became intoxicated and
69
caused a motor vehicle accident. Once again, despite holding the sale
contributed to the intoxication, the Murphy court noted that a time lapse
or other variable existing between a sale and consumption “may negate
70
causation as a matter of law.”
Finally, in Kvanli, a minor purchased an amount of alcohol from a
liquor store and shared the alcohol with another minor, who caused a
71
subsequent motor vehicle accident.
Although the court affirmed the
(1965).
65. See Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 57 N.W.2d 254 (1953); Murphy,
264 Minn. 457, 119 N.W.2d 489; Kvanli, 272 Minn. 481, 139 N.W.2d 275.
66. See Hahn, 238 Minn. at 430-32, 57 N.W.2d at 258.
67. 264 Minn. at 463, 119 N.W.2d at 493.
68. Id. at 459, 199 N.W.2d at 490.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 463, 119 N.W.2d at 493; see also Swinfin v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 345, 346,
34 N.W. 22, 22 (1887) (holding that damages are too remote where defendant furnished
alcohol to an intoxicated person who then acted voluntarily to assault plaintiff).
71. Kvanli v. Vill. of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 483, 139 N.W.2d 275, 277 (1965).
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finding of a causal connection between the sale and intoxication, the
Kvanli court held that time lapses or the occurrence of other intervening
events “could make the relationship between the sale and use too tenuous
73
to permit a finding of causal relationship.”
Although the Hahn, Murphy, and Kvanli decisions set forth a
general causation framework to link an illegal sale to the intoxication, the
decisions do not provide clear instruction on delineating “de minimus”
versus “material” consumption. From a practical standpoint, Minnesota
Dram Shop law remains without legislative guidance (or judicial
interpretation) to separate negligible alcohol service from service
actually “causing or contributing to” intoxication.
In assessing this issue, Minnesota could turn to other jurisdictions
74
for guidance. Specifically, the Illinois Liquor Control Act, which is
strikingly similar in expressing “cause” language and subsequent case
law interpretation of the term, provides useful instruction.
Similar to the Minnesota Civil Damages Act, the Illinois Liquor
Control Act provides a cause of action for every person whose injury was
in consequence of the intoxication of another and that the liquor service
75
contributed to the intoxication. Once again, like the Minnesota Civil
Damages Act, the Illinois Liquor Control Act reflects a legislative intent
to shift responsibility for damages occasioned by the use of alcohol on to
76
those who profit from its sale. Prior to 1971, Article VI, section 14 of
the Act provided in pertinent part: “Every person who is injured in
person or property by any intoxicated person, has a right of action . . .
severally or jointly, against any person who by selling or giving alcoholic
77
liquor, causes the intoxication, in whole or part, of such person.”
Based on the above provision, recovery was permissible under
Illinois law upon showing of consumption in a particular Dram Shop and
78
a resulting intoxication.
As originally codified, the threshold burden
72. Id. at 484-85, 139 N.W.2d at 278.
73. Id.
74. § 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1-5/12-4 (2003).
75. Id. at 5/6-21.
76. Cf. Carlson v. Thompson, 615 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (stating
the fundamental purpose of Civil Damages Act is “to uphold liability in respect to people
engaged in business, making profit in the provision of liquor”) with Kingston v. Turner,
505 N.E.2d 320, 325 (Ill. 1987) (observing that the legislative intent of the Dram Shop
Act is to place the responsibility for damages occasioned by the use of alcohol on those
who profit from its sale (citing Comment, The Illinois Dram Shop Act: The Effect of the
1971 Amendment, 74 U. ILL. L. F. 466, 477 (1974))).
77. Kingston, 505 N.E.2d at 325 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. 1969, ch. 43, par. 135).
78. Kingston, 505 N.E.2d at 325.
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for recovery was a showing the injury was in consequence of another’s
intoxication and that the liquor served “contributed in some degree, no
79
matter how slight,” to the intoxication.
However, following the 1971 amendment, the Illinois legislature
80
eliminated the “in whole or part” language from the statute. As noted
in subsequent scholarly review, the amendment was not intended to alter
the legislative intent and instead reflected an attempt to narrow liability
81
under the provision.
Under the amended provision, recovery was
allowed only against a person who, “by selling or giving alcoholic liquor,
82
causes the intoxication.”
In light of the amendment, Illinois courts quickly clarified the
causal requirement that the sale or provision of alcohol to the person
83
causing injuries must materially contribute to the intoxication.
In
Thompson v. Tranberg, the Illinois Court of Appeals stated:
We have concluded that the legislative intention in the use of
the word “causes” in the Dram Shop Act is best effectuated by
a focus on whether the defendant’s conduct was a material and
substantial factor in producing or contributing to produce the
intoxication . . . . It seems fair to conclude that the intent of the
legislature with respect to the 1971 amendment was to
eliminate the possibility that dram shop liability could be
founded on any consumption of alcohol no matter how slight
but to impose liability only when intoxication could be said as
84
a matter of fact to have been caused by the dram shop.
Following Thompson, the Illinois Supreme Court in Nelson v.
Araiza concluded the amended provisions applied because the defendant
“must have caused the intoxication and not merely have furnished a
85
After Nelson, Illinois courts provided
negligible amount of liquor.”
79. See Osborn v. Leuffgen, 45 N.E.2d 622, 625 (Ill. 1943).
80. See ILL. REV. STAT. 1983, ch. 43, par. 135 (1971).
81. See Comment, The Illinois Dram Shop Act: The Effect of the 1971 Amendment,
74 U. Ill. L.F. 466, 477 (1977).
82. See ILL. REV. STAT. 1983, ch. 43, par. 135 (1977).
83. See Kingston v. Turner, 505 N.E.2d 320 (Ill. 1987); Nelson v. Araiza, 372
N.E.2d 637, 639-40 (Ill. 1978) (holding that serving a negligible amount of alcoholic
liquor does not constitute causing intoxication within the meaning of the statute); Mohr v.
Jilg, 586 N.E.2d 807 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Henry v. Bloomington Third Ward Cmty. Club,
411 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Thompson v. Tranberg, 360 N.E.2d 108 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1977); Caruso v. Kazense, 313 N.E.2d 689, 697 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (stating the
amendment imposes liability only on the person who “caused the intoxication rather than
on any person who contributed to such condition”).
84. 360 N.E.2d at 111.
85. 372 N.E.2d at 639.
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further clarification of what constituted a material contribution so as to
“cause the intoxication” in Henry v. Bloomington Third Ward
86
87
88
Community Club, Kingston v. Turner, and Mohr v. Jilg.
In Henry, the Illinois Appellate Court held that a bar’s liability for
serving a small amount of alcohol to an already intoxicated person is a
jury question, and evidence of such intoxication based solely on the
89
plaintiff’s personal opinion was sufficient to present a jury question. In
that case, plaintiff Charles Henry and his brothers began drinking in a
tavern when Elmer Thomas (and a companion) entered the bar and
90
ordered one ounce of alcoholic liquor.
The plaintiff later testified
Thomas appeared intoxicated before receiving the liquor based on his
91
gait and unsteady appearance. Following minimal consumption of the
liquor, Thomas and his companion assaulted Henry and his brothers,
92
shooting Henry in the hip. Henry brought suit under the Dram Shop
Act for personal injuries and the circuit court granted a directed verdict
93
in favor of the tavern.
In reversing the directed verdict, the Henry court affirmed that “a
dramshop which serves a negligible amount of liquor to a sober person
would clearly not have ‘caused’ that person’s intoxication” under the
94
Act.
However, whether liability exists under the Act in light of
plaintiff’s testimony that the patron was intoxicated upon service is a
95
jury question.
Specifically, the jury’s function in such cases is to
determine whether the actions of the Dram Shop in providing service
was a “material and substantial factor” in exacerbating his state of
96
intoxication.
Later, in Kingston, the Illinois Supreme Court held it was possible
for the jury to find that an individual was intoxicated at the time of the
accident, but his intoxication was not caused by either of the two bars in
which he drank, when no clear evidence was presented proving he drank
97
more than a negligible amount at either bar.
Here, John Berry and
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

411 N.E.2d 540.
505 N.E.2d 320.
586 N.E.2d 807.
411 N.E.2d at 543.
Id. at 541.
See id.
Id. at 541-42.
Id. at 541.
Id at 543.
Id.
Id.
505 N.E.2d 320.
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companions traveled among three taverns on his motorcycle over a threehour period, during which time Berry consumed a total of four, twelveounce tap beers. Evidence from companions and eyewitnesses suggested
98
Berry was feeling the effects of the alcohol at the time of his departure.
Upon leaving the last tavern with a companion, Berry’s motorcycle
struck plaintiff Kingston’s vehicle, killing Kingston. Following suit by
Kingston’s heirs under the Act, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
99
defendants, which the appellate court reversed.
Discussing the impropriety of the jury instruction relating to
causation, the Kingston court explained that the amended Liquor Control
Act “cause” provision does not equate the terms “result” and “cause.”
Instead, guided by the previous Thompson holding, the Kingston court
instructed that “cause” refers to conduct that was “a material and
substantial factor in producing or contributing to produce the
100
intoxication.”
Consequently, the cause provision did not apply to de
minimus contributions to a party’s intoxication, and merely furnishing a
negligible amount of alcohol was no longer a sufficient basis for liability.
Therefore, although alcohol furnished at two separate taverns may cause
a single intoxication, a tavern may not be held liable for a de minimus
101
contribution to an individual’s intoxication.
Most recently, the Illinois Appellate Court in Mohr held that a
tavern that admittedly sold a relatively small amount of alcohol to a
customer immediately before the customer left the parking lot and
collided with plaintiff’s vehicle was liable under the Liquor Control
102
Act.
In that case, Defendant Dorothy Jilg consumed two twelveounce cans of beer at the Oasis Bar over a two-hour period. The plaintiff
presented no evidence to suggest Jilg was already intoxicated when
served, and the testimony conflicted concerning her subsequent
intoxication. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Oasis.
The plaintiff appealed the decision.
Despite the holding, the Mohr court reasoned from Thompson and
Kingston that to “cause” the intoxication of an individual, more than a
103
negligible amount of alcohol is required.
More importantly, the court
considered the situation in which a patron enters a Dram Shop in an

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See id. at 323.
Id.
Id. at 327.
Id.
Mohr v. Jilg, 586 N.E.2d 807 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
Id. at 807.
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intoxicated state and consumes a relatively small amount of alcohol. In
such cases, the Mohr court reasoned liability is unsupported for the
second tavern because the alcohol consumed contributed only a
104
negligible amount to the intoxication.
In discussing such
circumstances, the court affirmed that while alcohol furnished at two
separate taverns may both cause a patron’s intoxication, a tavern may not
be held liable for a de minimus contribution to an individual’s
105
intoxication.
Similar to the Minnesota Civil Damages Act, the Illinois Liquor
Control Act is remedial legislation designed to shift responsibility for
damages occasioned by the use of alcohol on those who profit from its
sale. In addition, the Minnesota and Illinois statutes are strikingly
similar regarding their expression of “cause” language and subsequent
case law interpretation of the term. Both require that the liquor sale
cause the intoxication, and qualify the “material and substantial” cause
contributing to the intoxication.
Faced with a causation standard similar to Minnesota’s, Illinois
courts have created a clearer definition of the amount of alcohol that
materially contributes to an intoxication and that therefore constitutes a
contributing cause of that intoxication. Illinois law provides wellreasoned authority that the provision of a negligible amount of alcohol to
an intoxicated person—where service was provided elsewhere—does not
result in liability because the alcohol consumed contributed only a
negligible amount to the intoxication. When presented with the
appropriate set of facts, Minnesota’s appellate courts should do the same,
adopting Illinois’ standard that the illegal sale be “a material and
substantial factor in providing or contributing to produce the
intoxication.”106
2. The Intoxication Caused the Injury
The claimant bears the burden of establishing that the illegal sale
107
was the proximate cause of his or her damages.
As discussed above,
104. Id. at 810.
105. Id.
106. Kingston v. Turner 505 N.E.2d 320, 327 (Ill. 1987).
107. Kryzer v. Champlin Am. Legion No. 600, 494 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn. 1992)
(citing Adamson v. Doughety, 248 Minn. 535, 542, 81 N.W.2d 110, 115 (1957)). See
also Hastings v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 396 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding that a plaintiff who crosses over the center line of the highway into an alleged
intoxicated person may fail to establish a causal connection between his injuries and the
illegal sale to the AIP).
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in Kryzer v. Champlin American Legion No. 600, the Minnesota
Supreme Court rejected a “but for” causation test to this element of a
108
Dram Shop claim.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently discussed proximate
cause in an unpublished case, Brockman v. Beacons Sports Bar &
109
Grill.
Brockman, Price, and Brockman’s cousin were drinking at
110
Price
Beacons Sports Bar & Grill (Beacons) in Duluth, Minnesota.
consumed beer and one Windsor Coke mixed drink before leaving
111
Beacons with Brockman and the others.
“Price drove erratically, went
through a stop sign, and then backed into a ditch . . . . As Brockman and
his cousin tried to push Price’s car out of the ditch, the car moved
backward and pinned Brockman against a retaining wall, causing a
severe crush-type injury to his left thigh and perineum . . . . Brockman
112
He left the hospital with a small,
was hospitalized for about a month.”
113
open wound, which later became infected.
Brockman underwent
surgery to drain the infection; he died of sudden, unexpected
114
cardiovascular collapse during administration of general anesthesia.
Brockman’s father sued Beacons, alleging a violation of
115
Minnesota’s Dram Shop Act.
The trial court granted Beacons’ motion
for summary judgment, ruling that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that Beacons made an illegal sale and that the illegal sale
116
proximately caused Brockman’s death. Brockman’s father appealed.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and began its analysis in
Brockman noting “[t]he person bringing the action must show that the
illegal sale caused the intoxication, and the intoxication was the
117
‘proximate cause’ of the injuries sustained.”
Consequences that
“follow in an unbroken sequence from the original wrongful act, without
an intervening efficient cause, are natural and proximate, and the original
wrongdoer is responsible for these consequences even when the
118
particular result is not foreseeable.”
The court noted, “the concept of
108. 494 N.W.2d at 37.
109. Brockman v. Beacons Sports Bar & Grill, No. C8-02-76, slip op. (Minn. Ct.
App. Sept. 10, 2002).
110. Id. at 2.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing Kryzer, 494 N.W.2d at 36).
118. Brockman, No. C8-02-76, slip op. at 4 (citing Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn.
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proximate cause has always encompassed unforeseen medical
119
In addition, the
complications that develop from the original injury.”
court of appeals found, “Brockman sustained injuries that required
extended hospitalization, necessitated surgery that required a general
anesthetic, and the administration of anesthesia triggered the circulatory
120
arrest that resulted in Brockman’s death.”
It added the observation
that “proximate cause also encompasses the aggravation of the original
121
injury caused by the administration of necessary medical care.”
The Brockman court, summing up its reversal of the trial court’s
decision, concluded:
The evidence establishes that, at the time of the surgery,
Brockman was an otherwise healthy, 25-year-old man. It is
undisputed that the surgery was a reasonable and necessary
procedure to treat injuries sustained in the car accident. The
medical evidence supports a claim that the administration of
anesthesia was responsible for triggering the circulatory arrest.
On these facts, the evidence is sufficient to create a triable
issue on proximate cause, it was therefore error to grant
122
summary judgment on that issue.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to embrace (or precisely
define) a formal proximate cause standard in the Dram Shop context.
However, the Brockman holding may forecast the future of which
proximate cause analysis will govern.
The Brockman court’s analysis focuses on common-law negligence
principles, which emphasize the hindsight (substantial factor) rather than
foresight (foreseeability) to determine whether the necessary casual link
exists between the intoxication and the ultimate injury. Although the
Brockman decision seems limited to more attenuated (and less direct)
circumstance and is of no precedential value, it certainly signals
traditional common-law principles may predominate proximate cause
analyses until the Minnesota Supreme Court weighs in on this issue. In
these authors’ humble opinion, until that time, similar “unbroken chains”
452, 454-55, 107 N.W.2d 859, 861-62 (1961)).
119. Brockman, No. C8-02-76, slip op. at 4; see Keegan v. Mpls. & St. Louis R.R.
Co., 76 Minn. 90, 91, 78 N.W. 965, 965 (1899) (establishing that the negligence of the
defendant was the proximate cause of the injury and, therefore, determining whether or
not the result that followed was reasonably anticipated is immaterial).
120. Brockman, No. C8-02-76, slip op. at 4.
121. Id. at 4-5 (citing Couillar v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 253 Minn. 418, 422, 92
N.W.2d 96, 99 (1958)) (recognizing that the original tortfeasor remains responsible for
proximate results of act even though injury is more serious as a result of medical care)).
122. Brockman, No. C8-02-76, slip op. at 6.
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may shackle liquor establishments (and their insurers) to increased Dram
Shop related liability.
III. PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES
A. Who May Bring a Claim?
Minnesota Statutes section 340A.801 provides a right of action for
“a spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured in
person, property, or means of support, or who incurs other pecuniary
123
The Minnesota Supreme Court held the term “other
loss . . . .”
person” refers to any other person injured by the intoxication of another
124
if that injured person played no role in the intoxication.
In the case of Haugland v. Mapleview Lounge Bottleshop, Inc., the
court discussed who is empowered to bring a claim under the Civil
125
Damages Act.
On February 20, 1999, Robert John Donovan, Sr. died
in an automobile accident, leaving his son and Haugland, his son’s
126
maternal aunt.
On February 12, 2001, Haugland served a summons
and complaint on Mapleview Lounge Bottleshop, Inc. (Mapleview
Lounge), asserting claims under Minnesota Statutes sections 340A.801
127
and 340A.802.
“The caption of the complaint identified the plaintiff
as ‘Debra K. Haugland, as trustee for the next of kin of Robert John
128
Donovan, Sr.’ ”
The trial court granted Mapleview Lounge’s motion
to dismiss on the ground “that the action for injury to Donovan’s
survivors could not be brought in the name of a trustee for the next of
kin, and the complaint could not be amended to name the real party in
interest because the applicable two-year statute of limitations had
129
Haugland appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
expired.”
Affirming the trial court, the court of appeals held that under the
Dram Shop Act a plaintiff must prove she suffered damages and must
130
bring the claim in her own name.
The court noted, “Haugland’s
complaint . . . does not allege that Haugland suffered any loss, as trustee
or in any other capacity . . . . Therefore [Haugland] . . . did not have a
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (2002).
Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Minn. 1998).
643 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 620.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 622 (citing Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 45, 70 N.W.2d 886, 898 (1995)).
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131

right of action under the Civil Damages Act.”
132
In permitting
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.
amendment of the complaint, the supreme court focused on Minnesota’s
status as a “notice pleading” state and the lack of prejudice in permitting
amendment. Justice Page, writing for the unanimous court, reasoned that
although the original, improperly captioned complaint did not identify a
proper party, the complaint provided the defendant with legally sufficient
133
notice of a civil damages action.
As the proposed amendment arose
out of the same occurrence set forth in the original complaint, Minnesota
134
Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01 permitted amendment.
Haugland is the Minnesota Supreme Court’s first decision
interpreting the Civil Damages Act since 2001. The case’s relevance lies
in its clarification of the procedural peculiarities of the Civil Damages
Act. Haugland’s claim would have withstood dismissal had she brought
the action in the name of the injured party, not in her own name as
trustee of the injured party. Alternatively, the claim apparently would
have survived if Haugland would have simply alleged personal loss or
injury in her complaint.
IV. TIMING REQUIREMENTS
A. Written Notice of Claim
Minnesota Statutes section 340A.802, subdivisions 1 and 2, require
written notice of injury to licensed retailers or municipal liquor stores
when a Dram Shop action is contemplated against one of these
135
The notice of claim requirement states:
entities.
In the case of a claim for damages, the notice must be served
by the claimant’s attorney within 240 days of the date of
entering an attorney-client relationship with the person in
regard to the claim. In the case of claims for contribution or
indemnity, the notice must be served within 120 days after the
injury occurs or within 60 days after receiving written notice of
a claim for contribution or indemnity, whichever is applicable.
No action for damage or for contribution or indemnity may be
131. Hauglund, 643 N.W.2d at 622.
132. Hauglund ex rel. Donovan v. Mapleview Lounge & Bottleshop, Inc., 666
N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 2003).
133. Id. at 694.
134. MINN. R. CIV. P. 15.01.
135. MINN. STAT. § 340A.802, subd. 2 (2002).
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136

maintained unless the notice has been given.
A plaintiff who brings a claim under the Dram Shop Act bears the
burden of proving the licensee had notice of a possible claim within the
137
In Wood v. Diamonds Sports Bar & Grill,
statutory notice period.
Inc., the Minnesota Court of Appeals took up the question of whether a
138
civil complaint alone can satisfy the notice requirement.
Jolane Wood’s boyfriend suffered injuries in an automobile accident
after leaving Diamonds Sports Bar & Grill (Diamonds), where he was
139
drinking.
Wood, who eventually married the boyfriend, filed a Dram
140
Wood’s
Shop claim against Diamonds under the Civil Damages Act.
attorney served a summons and complaint on Diamonds, containing the
information required by the notice statute, within 240 days after entering
141
into an attorney-client relationship with Wood.
However, after the
accident and before she initiated the Dram Shop action, Wood retained
another attorney to file bankruptcy. The bankruptcy attorney provided
142
no written notice of a Dram Shop claim to Diamonds.
Diamonds
moved for summary judgment, arguing Wood failed to give proper
notice: “(1) by not serving notice within 240 days after entering into an
attorney-client relationship with the bankruptcy attorney and (2) by not
143
serving notice before serving the complaint.”
The district court denied
144
Diamonds’ motion and Diamonds appealed.
The court of appeals recounted the Civil Damages Act’s notice
requirement:
A person who claims damages . . . from a licensed retailer of
alcoholic beverages . . . for or because of an injury within the
scope of section 340A.801 must give written notice to the
licensee . . . stating:
(1) the time and date when and person to whom the alcoholic
beverages were sold or bartered;
(2) the name and address of the person or persons who were
injured or whose property was damaged; and
(3) the approximate time and date, and the place where the
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Schulte v. Corner Club Bar, 544 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Minn. 1996).
654 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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145

injury to person or property occurred.
Furthermore,
In the case of a claim for damages, the notice must be served
by the claimant’s attorney within 240 days of the date of
entering an attorney-client relationship with the person in
146
regard to the claim.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Diamond’s
motion for summary judgment, observing that nothing in the statute
precluded giving the required notice via service of a complaint that
provided the information required by statute within 240 days after an
147
attorney is retained.
Diamonds argued that the purpose of the notice
requirement is to allow the licensee time to conduct a prelitigation
148
While recognizing the supreme court’s
investigation of the facts.
observance that the notice requirement helps provide Dram Shops with
an early opportunity to investigate claims, the Wood court noted,
“Diamonds admits that, if a process server were to hand to a licensee
notice first and then a summons and complaint containing the same
factual information seconds later, the notice requirement would be
149
satisfied.”
The court stated, “This would be an absurd triumph of
form over substance, and we must presume that the legislature did not
150
intend such a result.”
The court held that “service of a complaint that
contains the information described in section 340A.802, subdivision 1,
within the 240-day specified in section 340A.802, subdivision 2, satisfies
151
the dram-shop notice requirement.”
B. Statute of Limitations
In Minnesota, a plaintiff must commence an action within the time
periods provided in Minnesota Statutes section 541.01, except where a
152
statute prescribes a different limitation.
The Civil Damages Act
145. Id. at 707 (citing MINN. STAT. § 340A.802, subd. 1 (2002)).
146. Wood, 654 N.W.2d at 707 (citing MINN. STAT. § 340A.802, subd. 2). Because
Diamonds failed to raise in its main brief the issue of whether the bankruptcy attorney
should have provided notice of Wood’s Dram Shop claim, the issue was not properly
before the court and was not addressed.
147. Wood, 654 N.W.2d at 708.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 708-09.
150. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 645.17(2) (2002).
151. Wood, 654 N.W.2d at 709 (citing Wegan v. Vill. of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d
273, 280 (Minn. 1981)).
152. MINN. STAT. § 541.01 (2002). “In ascertaining the intention of the legislature
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states, “No action may be maintained under Section § 340A.801 unless
153
However, two specific
commenced within two years after injury.”
instances have addressed the application of the limitations requirements
in the Civil Damages Act: (1) claims made by minors, and (2) the notice
requirements for contribution and indemnity claims by tortfeasors against
liquor vendors.
Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 541.15(a)(1), the statutes of
limitations for most claims brought by minors are tolled until they reach
154
age 19.
However, as noted above, the statute of limitations under the
Civil Damages Act requires actions to be brought within two years of the
155
The
injury and does not address tolling of the limitation period.
Minnesota Supreme Court in Whitener ex rel. Miller v. Dahl addressed
the discrepancy between the minority tolling statute and the Civil
156
Damages Act.
Sandra Bower spent the night drinking at the Flowing Well Supper
157
Club and suffered fatal injuries in a car accident after leaving the club.
Her four minor children filed a lawsuit against Flowing Well asserting
claims under the Minnesota Civil Damages Act for damages resulting
from respondent’s allegedly illegal sale of alcohol to their mother hours
158
before her death in a car accident.
They served suit on the bar on
April 1, 1999, more than three years after Sandra Bowers’ fatal
159
accident.
Flowing Well moved for summary judgment because the
plaintiffs commenced the action after the two-year limitation under
160
Minnesota Statutes section 340A.802, subdivision 2.
The plaintiffs
objected, arguing their action was timely under the minority-tolling
161
Flowing Well came
statute, Minnesota Statutes section 541.15(a)(1).
up dry when the trial court denied its motion and certified the question:
“Is the statute of limitations, for the cause of action of the minor children
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 340A.801 et seq., tolled pursuant to Minn. Stat.

the courts may be guided by the following presumptions: (1) The legislature does not
intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable . . .” MINN. STAT.
§ 645.17 (2002).
153. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (2002).
154. MINN. STAT. § 541.15(a)(1) (2002).
155. MINN. STAT. § 340A.802, subd. 2 (2002).
156. 625 N.W.2d 827 (Minn. 2001).
157. Id. at 828.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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162

§ 541.15?”
The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded the minor
plaintiffs’ claims were not barred; therefore, the two-year statute of
163
limitations barred their claims. The supreme court affirmed.
The supreme court began its analysis in Whitener recognizing the
apparent conflict between Minnesota’s minority-tolling statute and the
164
Civil Damages Act.
“The minority-tolling statute creates a general
exception to statutes of limitations for claims of minors, and provides . . .
that the running of the statute of limitations on a cause of action shall be
suspended as to a minor plaintiff until one year after the minor reaches
165
age eighteen.”
“The Civil Damages Act . . . contains its own statute of
limitations requiring commencement of an action within two years after
166
167
the date of injury.”
Citing Cashman v. Hedberg, the state’s highest
court observed that it would make no exception to the limitations period
provided by a statute granting a statutorily created right unless that
statute contains a clause stating general tolling statutes or other
168
exceptions apply.
The court implicitly adopted the court of appeals’
review of the indicia of legislative intent, noting:
[B]ecause the minority-tolling statute was enacted long before
the Civil Damages Act, the legislature could not have intended
the tolling statute to apply to a statutorily-created cause of
action not then in existence. The court noted we have long
held that because the right to bring an action for wrongful
death is granted by statute in derogation of the common law, it
is conditioned upon compliance with the statute of limitations
169
contained in the statute creating the right.
In finding the four minor plaintiffs failed to timely commence their
action, the supreme court found ample evidence the legislature did not
intend to allow the minor tolling statute to extend the Civil Damages Act
170
two-year statute of limitations.
171
The case of Wollan v. Jahnz addressed the applicability of a sixyear statute of limitations to a claim under the Civil Damages Act,
Minnesota Statutes section 340A.801, subdivision 6 for providing
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 541.15(a), 340A.801-.802 (2000)).
Whitener, 625 N.W.2d at 828-29 (citing MINN. STAT. § 541.15(a) (2000)).
Whitener, 625 N.W.2d at 829.
215 Minn. 463, 467, 10 N.W.2d 388, 391 (1943).
Whitener, 625 N.W.2d at 829.
Id. at 829-30 (citing Cashman, 215 Minn. at 467-72, 10 N.W.2d at 391-93).
Whitener, 625 N.W.2d at 833-34.
656 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
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alcohol to a minor who then injures another.172 Grizzly’s Sports Bar
hosted an employee Christmas party and provided alcoholic beverages to
173
Jahnz, an employee younger than 21, who then became intoxicated.
Later, Jahnz was driving a snowmobile with Wollan as a passenger when
174
Wollan sued Jahnz in 1998
the snowmobile flipped, injuring Wollan.
and in August 2001 sought to amend the complaint to include Grizzly’s
Sports Bar (Grizzly’s) and its owners under Minnesota Statutes section
175
340A.801, subdivision 6.
Grizzly’s moved to dismiss the case based
176
on the two-year statute of limitations.
Wollan argued the two-year
limitations period did not apply to her claim and that it was timely based
on the six-year limitation period for common-law negligence actions
177
under Minnesota Statutes section 541.05, subdivision 1(5).
The trial
178
179
Wollan appealed.
court granted Grizzly’s motion to dismiss.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals began its analysis by noting the
judicial and legislative history of claims brought by minors related to the
180
illegal provision of alcohol.
In 1985, the Minnesota Supreme Court
181
that “a social host is not liable in a
held in Holmquist v. Miller
182
common-law action for negligently serving alcohol to a minor.”
Reacting to the supreme court’s decision in Holmquist, the Minnesota
Legislature amended the Civil Damages Act to provide: “Nothing in this
chapter precludes common law tort claims against any person 21 years or
older who knowingly provides or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a
183
person under the age of 21 years.”
In light of its legislative and judicial heritage, the Wollan court
reasoned Minnesota Statutes section 340A.801, subdivision 6 did not
create a new cause of action and merely granted permission to apply
common-law negligence principles to service-to-minor-related tort

172. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 6 (2002) ( “Nothing in this chapter precludes
common law tort claims against any person 21 years old or older who knowingly
provides or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person under the age of 21 years.”)
173. Wollan, 656 N.W.2d at 417.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 418.
181. 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985).
182. Wollan, 656 N.W.2d at 418 (citing Holmquist, 367 N.W.2d at 472).
183. Wollan, 656 N.W.2d at 418 (citing MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 6 (2002));
VanWagner v. Mattison, 533 N.W.2d 75, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
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claims.184 More precisely, subdivision 6’s tacit approval of common law
actions (against both social hosts and other alcohol vendors) validated
ongoing application of the six-year statute of limitations under
Minnesota Statutes section 541.05, subdivision 1(5).
At first blush, it may be difficult to reconcile the decisions in
Haugland, Wood, Whitener, and Wollan. Upon a closer analysis,
however, the cases are distinguishable and reflect the appellate court’s
desire to strictly construe and curb the scope of legislatively created
causes of action, while at the same time providing injured parties the
opportunity to pursue their claims despite purported technical
deficiencies. Although Wood and Haugland were decided by different
appellate courts and involved interpretations of different procedural
provisions of the Civil Damages Act, both cases reflect an underlying
judicial distaste for depriving Dram Shop plaintiffs of their claims based
solely on procedural technicalities. The supreme court’s decision in
Haugland goes further in this regard than the court of appeals ruling in
Wood, but both are defensible decisions given the public policy
underlying the Civil Damages Act and the rationale employed by both
reviewing bodies. Similarly, the court of appeals’ decision in Wollan
reflects a careful and purposeful preservation of common law claims
against potential liquor vendors and providers, based solely on the
common-law pedigree of the claims. The supreme court’s ruling in
Whitener maintained the court’s long-standing policy of strictly adhering
to the language of statutes creating causes of action not recognized at
common law even in the face of arguably harsh results.
V. DAMAGES
A. Loss of Means of Support
Courts have defined “loss of means of support” as an “actual
185
It is not limited to
diminution in the plaintiff’s standard of living.”
damages to which the injured party had a legal right; the plaintiff may
186
recover for any and all damages.

184. Wollan, 656 N.W2d at 418. It is difficult to understand this analysis. If the
common law did not recognize tort claims for providing a minor with alcoholic beverages
in the first place, a statute that permits something that never existed should be a nullity.
185. Fitzer v. Bloom, 253 N.W.2d 395, 404 (Minn. 1977) (citing Herbes v. Vill. of
Holdingford, 267 Minn. 75, 84, 125 N.W.2d 426, 432 (1963)).
186. Fitzer, 253 N.W.2d at 398.
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In Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. A & A Liquors of St. Cloud, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals clarified the meaning of “loss-of-means-of187
support” under Minnesota Statutes section 340A.801.
The plaintiff,
who alleged damages because of A & A’s violation of the Civil Damages
Act, moved for a declaration that he was entitled to loss-of-means-ofsupport coverage under A & A’s liquor-liability policy for the reduction
in his standard of living pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
188
189
The district court denied his motion and he appealed.
340A.801.
Plaintiff contended the district court erred by concluding that under
the Civil Damages Act, he could not recover for “loss of means of
190
support” and “bodily-injury” damages.
The court of appeals affirmed
191
the trial court.
It noted the Civil Damages Act “is both penal and
remedial because while the statute serves to punish an offending vendor
and deter others from making illegal sales of liquor, it also serves to
compensate those who would under ordinary circumstances or other tort
192
principles obtain no recovery for their injuries.”
Therefore, the court reasoned, the statute requires a liquor
establishment to carry an insurance policy containing minimum limits for
193
both bodily injury and “loss of support.”
Nevertheless, the court
concluded the Civil Damages Act did not allow appellant to claim loss194
of-support damages for himself.
The court observed that, “Minn. Stat.
§ 340A.801, subd. 1, which is the only provision that confers a cause of
action under the Civil Damages Act, does not include the injured
195
person.”
Although the statute did not define means of support, the
court found that this phrase “incorporates within it the requirement that a
196
The court bolstered its conclusion by
claimant be a dependent.”
noting “no reported Minnesota cases have ever granted ‘loss-of-meansof-support’ damages to the injured ‘breadwinner.’ Rather, the loss-of187. 649 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
188. Id. at 869.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 871.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing Hannah v. Chmielewski, Inc., 323 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn. 1982)).
193. Britamco, 649 N.W.2d at 871 (citing MINN. STAT. § 340A.409, subd. 1(1)
(2000)).
194. Britamco, 649 N.W.2d at 871.
195. Id. at 872.
196. Id.; see Jones v. Fisher, 309 N.W.2d 726, 730 (Minn. 1981) (comparing the
damages of Dram Shop claims to the damages for wrongful death claims, the court states
that the damages that are common for both the negligent tortfeasors and the Dram Shop
tortfeasors are those damages that will compensate the surviving spouse and children for
loss of means of support).
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197

support cases have involved dependents.”
B. Pecuniary Loss

In 1982, the legislature amended the Civil Damages Act to allow
recovery of pecuniary losses in addition to damages for injury to person,
property, and means of support. The phrase “pecuniary loss” means
198
A
damages for loss of advice, comfort, assistance, and protection.
claim for “pecuniary loss” is an independent action brought by a spouse
199
who is dependent on the other person’s support.
In the recent, unpublished case of DeSanti v. Youngs, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals clarified the issue of pecuniary loss damages and held
200
they are not limited to Dram Shop claims resulting in death.
In
DeSanti, the jury found both The Barn and Youngs negligent and
201
apportioned 50% fault to each.
The Barn moved for JNOV or,
202
The trial court denied The Barn’s motion
alternatively, a new trial.
and entered judgment against it for $628,274.94, which included
203
$200,000 awarded to John DeSanti for pecuniary loss.
The Barn
appealed.
On appeal, The Barn argued that pecuniary loss should apply only
to Civil Damages Act cases where the individual for whom a loss is
204
claimed is dead.
Affirming the trial court, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals began its analysis of the case quoting the Civil Damages Act,
which provides, in pertinent part,
A spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person
injured in person, property, or means of support, or who incurs
other pecuniary loss by an intoxicated person or by the
intoxication of another person, has a right of action in the
person’s own name for all damages sustained against a person
who caused the intoxication of that person by illegally selling
205
alcoholic beverages.
It further noted, “Pecuniary loss damages include loss of aid,
197.
198.
1995).
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Britamco, 649 N.W.2d at 872.
Brault v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 538 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Minn. Ct. App.
Id.
DeSanti v. Youngs, No. C8-02-1311, slip op. (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003).
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 1 (2002) (alteration in original)).
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206

advice, comfort, and protection.”
Noting it previously addressed the
same issue in Coolidge v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., the Minnesota
Court of Appeals held that “[t]he term ‘pecuniary loss’ has a common
and approved definition, which contains no limitation to ‘death’
207
cases.”
The court observed the statutory language analyzed in
208
Coolidge had not changed; therefore, it concluded the Civil Damages
Act contained no ambiguity regarding how pecuniary loss damages may
be applied. Plaintiffs were not barred from recovering pecuniary loss
damages even though the party directly injured by the AIP remained
alive.
Perhaps no area in Minnesota’s Dram Shop jurisprudence is as
fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty as the interplay between the
damages allowed under the statute and the provisions of the liquor
liability policies designed to provide coverage for Dram Shop claims. It
all began with the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision in Brault v.
209
Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co.
The Dram Shop Act requires that liquor purveyors maintain an
insurance policy providing $50,000/$100,000 in liability coverage for
bodily injury and $50,000/$100,000 coverage for loss of means of
210
support.
In 1987, the Minnesota Legislature modified the Dram Shop
Act to add to the list of injuries recovery of “pecuniary” losses in
addition to damages for injury to person, property, and means of support.
The 1987 modification essentially “grafted” pecuniary loss damages into
the Act as a type of recoverable damages, but the legislature did not
expressly indicate whether “pecuniary loss” damages were a category
separate from statutorily required loss of means of support coverage
and/or bodily injury coverage. In Brault, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals was asked to determine the extent of coverage offered by two
different liquor liability policies. The first, from Acceptance Indemnity
Insurance Co., was determined by the court to be ambiguous because the
insuring clause, which made no reference to the phrase “pecuniary loss,”
promised to cover the bar for “all” amounts the bar was obligated to pay
211
resulting from liability under the Civil Damages Act.
Since the policy
206. DeSanti, No. C8-02-1311, slip op. at 11 (citing Coolidge v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 523 N.W.2d 5, 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)).
207. DeSanti, No. C8-02-1311, slip op. at 11-12 (citing Coolidge, 523 N.W.2d at 7).
208. DeSanti, No. C8-02-1311, slip op. at 12; see MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subd. 1
(2002).
209. 538 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
210. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.409, subd. 1(1).
211. Brault, 538 N.W.2d at 148.
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did not provide a limit for “pecuniary loss,” the court concluded the
212
Similarly, the Brault
aggregate liability limits ($300,000) applied.
court found the second policy at issue, promulgated by Empire Fire &
Marine Insurance Co., did not adequately delineate between coverage for
213
pecuniary loss and bodily injury damages.
Empire argued pecuniary
loss damages were payable subject to the bodily injury limits of $50,000,
but the court of appeals brusquely dismissed this argument by noting
214
“[p]ecuniary loss is not bodily injury . . . .” As with the Acceptance
215
policy, it found the $300,000 aggregate policy limits applied.
Reading between the lines of Brault, the court’s primary issue with
the underlying policy was its failure to account for a specific separate
item of damages (pecuniary loss) permitted under the Minnesota Dram
Shop Act. In reaction to Brault, many insurers modified the language in
their policies to provide that loss of means of support includes damages
for pecuniary loss. Some practitioners do not believe these modifications
adequately address the so-called Brault issue, contending that in many
instances these attempts improperly dilute statutory minimum coverage
216
for “loss of means of support.”
To date, no Minnesota appellate
courts have reviewed whether such attempted policy modifications
would pass muster under Brault or not.
Insurers dissatisfied or concerned about the validity of adding
“pecuniary loss” to a policy’s coverage limits for “loss of means of
support” may want to consider having their policies separately define
“pecuniary loss” and include separate limits of liability for “pecuniary
217
loss” damages.
The statute, as currently written, does not provide any
minimum limits for pecuniary loss as in the case of “loss of means of
support” and “bodily injury,” both of which require minimum limits of
$50,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence. An insurer could
simply add pecuniary loss as a category of coverage distinct from bodily
injury and loss of means of support. Theoretically, the insurer could
establish any limit it felt reasonable because the statute defines only
pecuniary loss as the measure of damages but does not establish a
212. Id.
213. Id. at 148-49.
214. Id. at 149.
215. Id.
216. See Leo Feeney and Patricia Yoedicke, Obtaining Maximum Dram Shop
Coverage for Innocent Victims, MINNESOTA TRIAL LAWYER, Winter 1998, Vol. 23, No. 1,
at 14.
217. We are indebted to our colleague, Mark Condon, for his ideas and suggestions
in this regard.
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minimum required insurance coverage limit for it. A safe approach
would be to add a separate coverage limit of $50,000 per person and
$100,000 per occurrence. As the insurer adopting such an approach
would potentially be accepting more risk and exposure, it would have to
adjust premiums accordingly.
Perhaps a better approach would be for the legislature to amend the
Civil Damages Act to address the Brault problem. As the Civil Damages
Act provides a statutory cause of action for claims generally not
recognized under the common law, the legislature has very broad
discretion in delineating the scope of damages awarded and the minimum
insurance coverage limits for those damages. The easiest and cleanest
way to do so would involve amending the statute to specifically provide
that the statutory minimum limits for “loss of means of support”
encompass “pecuniary loss” damages. If the legislature, in its judgment,
believed such an approach diminished the ability of plaintiffs to recover
“pecuniary loss” damages, it could increase the statutory minimum for
“loss of means of support.”
Another approach could involve eliminating the separate statutory
minimum limits for “bodily injury” and “loss of means of support” and
establish single, unitary minimum limits for all damages recoverable
under the Civil Damages Act. For example, the minimum limits could
be $100,000 per person, $200,000 per occurrence and $300,000
218
aggregate.
VI. COMPARATIVE FAULT
In the waning days of the 2003 legislative session, the Minnesota
Legislature approved an amendment to Minnesota Statutes 604.02,
subdivision 1 that substantially alters Minnesota law with regard to joint
and several liability. The amendment, which applies to “claims arising
from events that occur on or after August 1, 2003,” reads as follows:
Subdivision 1. [JOINT LIABILITY.] When two or more
persons are severally liable, contributions to awards shall be in
proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each,
except that the following persons are jointly and severally
liable for the whole award:

218. Obviously, the legislature would have to consider many factors in adopting such
an approach, including the public policy underlying the CDA, the nature and extent of
damages suffered by plaintiffs in these cases, and the impact on liquor liability insurance
availability and cost.
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(1) a person whose fault is greater than 50 percent;
(2) two or more persons who act in a common scheme or plan
that results in injury;
(3) a person who commits an intentional tort; or
(4) a person whose liability arises under chapters 18B—
pesticide control, 115—water pollution control, 115A—waste
management, 115B—environmental response and liability,
115C—leaking underground storage tanks, and 299J—pipeline
safety, public nuisance law for damage to the environment or
the public health, any other environmental or public health law,
or any environmental or public health ordinance or program of
a municipality as defined in section 466.01.
Before the amendment, Minnesota’s comparative fault law provided
219
For example, a
different limitations on joint and several liability.
person whose apportioned fault was 15% or less could be jointly and
severally responsible for no more than four times her apportioned share
220
of fault.
For example, if a defendant was found 10% at fault, she
could be jointly and severally liable for no more than 40% of an entire
award or verdict. If, however, that defendant were found 16% or more at
fault, she could be responsible for the entire award. Minnesota’s prior
comparative fault statute also included a “cap” on joint and several
liability for municipalities, which provides that if municipalities were
less than 35% at fault, they could be held responsible for no more than
221
two times the allocated fault.
For example, if a city were found 20%
at fault, it could be held responsible for no more than 40% of a verdict
subject, of course, to any other caps on municipal tort liability. On the
other hand, if that city were found 36% at fault, it could be responsible
for the entire verdict, again subject to any municipal tort liability caps.
Under the new joint and several liability statute, it appears neither a
person nor a municipality could be held jointly and severally responsible
for an entire award unless the person or municipality were found 51% or
222
more at fault.
The implications of this change in Minnesota’s
comparative fault landscape are enormous. Drunken drivers, who cause
219. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 1 (2002).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 1 (2003). The new statute also provides for joint
and several liability where two or more persons act in a common scheme or plan resulting
in injury, a person commits an intentional tort, or a person incurs liability under various
specified environmental, public nuisance, and public health statutes. Id.
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the vast majority of carnage leading to Minnesota Dram Shop cases,
often have no insurance or carry the statutory minimum “30/60” limits.
Plaintiffs, whether they suffer bodily injury or pecuniary loss/loss of
means of support, often have potential damages far exceeding the
relatively modest insurance limits of the AIP/drunken driver. The
incentive to pursue Dram Shop claims against a bar, which may carry
insurance limits ranging from the statutory minimum of “50/100/300” to
$1 million or more in such situations, is plain on its face. Before this
amendment, a bar found 16% responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries could
be jointly and severally liable for the entire verdict. Following the
amendment, if the accident occurs on or after August 1, 2003, and the bar
is 50% or less responsible for plaintiff’s damages, that bar will be
responsible only for its apportioned share of fault. The following
example illustrates the huge impact this change will have on a typical
223
Dram Shop case.
1. Assume a jury made the following allocation of fault
between the AIP/drunken driver, Bill Turnipp, and the Happy
Tap bar: AIP, 80% at fault and Happy Tap 20% at fault.
(Plaintiff was not at fault.) Furthermore, assume the AIP’s
auto liability limits are $30,000 and the bar’s applicable liquor
liability limits are $100,000. Finally, assume the plaintiff has
$100,000 in damages.
2. If the accident causing the plaintiff’s damages and incurring
defendants’ liability occurred before August 1, 2003, the
defendants would pay the verdict as follows. The AIP would
pay $30,000. The Happy Tap, although only 20% at fault,
would be jointly and severally liable for the remaining
224
damages awarded, or $70,000.
3. If the accident causing the plaintiff’s damages and incurring
defendants’ liability occurred after August 1, 2003, the
defendants would pay the verdict as follows: the AIP would
pay $30,000, and the Happy Tap, 20% at fault, would pay no
more than its allocated share of fault—in this hypothetical
225
The plaintiff has $50,000 in damages
case, $20,000.
223. As anyone who has practiced in this area can tell the reader, there is no such
thing as a “typical” Dram Shop case. The cast of characters and the setting for the case
all illustrate the maxim that “truth is stranger than fiction.”
224. Happy Tap paid $50,000 more than it should have and, after paying the verdict,
Happy Tap could try to collect the $50,000 from AIP Turnipp. In most circumstances,
however, that is not possible because the AIP has no assets and is otherwise judgmentproof. Hence, the phrase, “You cannot get blood from a Turnipp.”
225. The authors, unwilling to tread on the political minefield left in the wake of the
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226

VII. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Legislature has attempted to remedy the damages
inflicted on innocent parties by illegal sales of liquor to drunken drivers
and others by creating the Civil Damages Act and molding it with
subsequent legislative enactments.
As the preceding analysis
demonstrates, however, Minnesota’s appellate courts continue to
valiantly struggle to define the boundaries of the Act. The legislature, as
the progenitor of an Act in providing a remedy unavailable at common
law, bears the ultimate responsibility and remains best-suited to
addressing ambiguities and problems with the Civil Damages Act.

legislature’s amendment of the comparative fault statute, do not offer any judgment about
whether the amendment is “fair or unfair,” “good or bad,” etc. The hypothetical is
offered merely to illustrate the impact of this amendment on plaintiffs and defendants
involved in civil claims asserted under the Civil Damages Act.
It should be noted that this analysis does not apply in so-called “dead drunk”
cases, where the AIP dies and his family or other party brings a Dram Shop claim. Under
the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Bushland, the AIP’s comparative fault is not
imputed to his survivors. Bushland v. Corner Pocket & Billiard Lounge, Inc., 462
N.W.2d 615 (Minn. App. 1990). See also Paulson v. Lapa, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 373 (Minn.
App. 1990).
226. See supra note 208.
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